We investigate the possibility of completing financial markets in a model with no exogenous probability measure and market imperfections. A necessary and sufficient condition is obtained for such extension to be possible.
Introduction.
Since the seminal contributions of Arrow [4] and of Radner [24] , market completeness and the no arbitrage principle have played a prominent rôle in financial economics. Market completeness, as first noted by Arrow, is a crucial property as it permits the optimal allocation of risk bearing among risk averse agents. In fact the equilibria of an economy under conditions of uncertainty but with competitive and complete financial markets are equivalent to those of an ordinary static economy so that classical welfare theorems apply. The equilibrium analysis on which this conclusion rests requires that financial markets are free of arbitrage opportunities.
General equilibrium theory with financial markets, however, is traditionally cast in the framework of a finite state space (or at least of an infinite sequence economy with finitely many states at each date) in which an appropriate justification of market incompleteness is more difficult. Our model will assume a completely arbitrary set Ω as the sample space -a situation to which we shall refer as complexity. We believe that, despite the fast pace of financial innovation, the complexity of modern economic systems seems to be growing as fast which makes market completion an ongoing process. A natural consequence of this analysis is the assumption that in a complex world financial markets are incomplete. Given this general premise, the main questions we address in the paper are: (a) can an incomplete set of financial markets be extended to a complete one while preserving the basic economic principle of absence of arbitrage opportunities? (b) if so, can such an extension be supported by a competitive market mechanism?
Our answer is that this need not be the case. Competition on financial markets may in principle produce two distinct outcomes. On the first hand it lowers margins on currently traded assets and results thus in lower prices. On the other hand, competition involves the design and issuance of new securities. We argue that lower prices on the existing securities may destroy the possibility to obtain complete markets free of arbitrage opportunities. In principle the net effect of competition on collective welfare may be unclear. Second, we argue that the completion of financial markets in respect of the no arbitrage principle may not be possible under linear pricing (which we take as synonymous of perfect competition). We actually provide an explicit example. On the other hand we show that if such an extension is possible with a limited degree of market power, it is then possible under perfect competition as well.
We should make clear that, although it is indeed natural and appropriate on a general ground, to interpret the extension of markets as the effect of financial innovation, we do not model the strategic behaviour of intermediaries, as done, e.g., by Allen and Gale [2] or Bisin [7] . We rather study the properties of pricing functions described as a sublinear functional on the space of traded assets' payoffs. The non linearity of prices captures the non competitive nature of financial markets as well as the role of other market imperfections.
In addition to market power, our model departs from traditional financial literature inasmuch as it lacks of any particular mathematical structure, topological or measure theoretic. In particular, following the thread of our previous papers [10] and [13] , we do not assume the existence of any exogenously given probability measure. Although this choice implies giving up the powerful artillery of stochastic analysis, particularly in continuous time, it permits, we believe, a better understanding of how financial markets work in a context of unrestricted complexity. A thorough discussion of the reasons supporting this choice may be found in [10] .
In recent years there have been several papers in which the assumption of a given reference probability is relaxed, if not abandoned. Riedel [25] (and more recently Burzoni, Riedel and Soner [9] ) suggests that an alternative approach to finance should be based on the concept of Knightian uncertainty. A typical implication of this approach is that a multiplicity of probability priors is given -rather than a single one. Some authors, including Bouchard and Nutz [8] , interpret this multiplicity as an indication of model uncertainty, a situation in which each prior probability corresponds to a different model that possesses all the traditional properties but in which it is unknown which of the models should be considered the correct one. An exemplification is the paper by Epstein and Ji [20] in which model uncertainty simply translates into ambiguity concerning the volatility parameter. Other papers, among which the ones by Davis and Hobson [16] and by Acciaio et al [1] , take the sample space to consist of all of the trajectories of some underlying asset and study the prices of options written thereon based on a path by path or model-free definition of arbitrage.
In our model, and similarly to Arrow's setting, contingent claims are described simply as functions of the sample space Ω. Differently from the papers mentioned above, this need not be a space of trajectories (and thus a Polish space) and the functions describing securities payoffs need not be continuous in any possible sense. Moreover, we do not adopt the pointwise definition of arbitrage suggested in [1] , as this would implicitly correspond to assuming a form of rationality on economic agents even more extreme than probabilistic sophistication. Our starting point is rather a criterion of economic rationality embodied in a partial order which describes on what all agents agree when saying that "f is more than g". This modeling of economic rationality, first introduced in [13] , is referred to as common order in [9] .
In section 2 we describe the model in all details, we introduce the notion of arbitrage and prove some properties of prices. In section 3 we characterize the set of pricing measures and in the following section 4 we prove one of our main results, Theorem 1, in which the existence of market extensions is fully characterized. Then, in section 5 we establish a second fundamental result, Theorem 2, in which we give exact conditions for such an extension to be competitive. Several additional implications are proved. Given its importance in the reference literature, in section 6 we examine the question of countable additivity and eventually, in section 7 we return on the interpretation of the common order as a probabilistic ranking.
The Economy.
We model the market as a triple, (X , ≥ * , π), in which X describes the set of payoffs generated by the traded assets, ≥ * the criterion of collective rationality used in the evaluation of investment projects and π is the price of each asset as a function of its payoff. Each of these elements will now be described in detail.
Before getting to the model we introduce some useful notation. Throughout Ω will be an arbitrary, non empty set that we interpret as the sample space so that the family F(Ω) of real valued functions on Ω will be our ambient space. If A ⊂ F(Ω), we write A u to denote its closure in the topology of uniform distance. A class of special importance in F(Ω) is the family B(Ω) of bounded functions. The symbol P(Ω) designates the collection of finitely additive, probability functions defined on the power set of Ω. All probabilities in this paper will be considered to be just finitely additive, unless explicitly indicated, in which case the symbol P is replaced with P ca . General references for the theory of finitely additive set functions and integrals are [18] and [5] .
2.1. Economic Rationality. A natural order to assign to F(Ω) is pointwise order, to wit f (ω) ≥ g(ω)
for all ω ∈ Ω, also written as f ≥ g. The lattice symbols |f | or f + will always refer to such natural order.
Natural as it may appear, pointwise order is not an adequate description of how economic agents rank random quantities according to their magnitude, save when the underlying sample space is particularly simple, such as a finite set. For example, it is well documented that investors base their decisions on a rather incomplete assessment of the potential losses arising from the selected portfolios, exhibiting a sort of asymmetric attention that leads them to neglect some scenarios, in contrast with a pointwise ranking of investment projects 1 . In a complex world, in which the attempt to formulate a detailed description of Ω is out of reach, rational inattention is just one possible approach to deal with complexity. A different approach is the one followed in probability theory to reduce complexity by restricting to measurable quantities.
In this paper, following the thread of [13] , we treat monotonicity as a primitive economic notion represented by a further transitive, reflexive binary relation on F(Ω). To distinguish it from the pointwise order ≥, we us the symbol ≥ * .
Let α represent the preference system of agent α over all acts F(Ω) and assume that (1) (i). 1 ≻ α 0 and that (ii). f ≥ g implies f α g i.e. that α is non trivial and pointwise monotonic. Then an implicit, subjective criterion of monotonicity (or rationality), ≥ α , may be deduced by letting
A mathematical criterion ≥ * describing collective rationality may then be defined as the meet of all such individual rankings, i.e. as
(3) f ≥ * g if and only if f ≥ α g for each agent α the asymmetric part of ≥ * will be written as > * . One easily deduces the following, useful properties:
which will be the basis for what follows 2 .
It will be useful to remark that if f ≥ * 0 then, by property (4b), f 1 {f ≤0} ≥ * 0 so that f ≥ * f − 2f 1 {f ≤0} = |f |. Associated with ≥ * is the collection of negligible sets It is immediate to note that any exogenously given probability measure P (countably or finitely additive) induces a corresponding ranking defined as
which satisfies the above axioms (4) . The same would be true if P were replaced with a family P ⊂ P(Ω) and if we defined accordingly (7) f ≥ P h if and only if f ≥ P h for all P ∈ P. 2 The first paper to treat monotonicity in an axiomatic way was, of course, Kreps [22] . In a recent paper, Burzoni et al [9] adopt an approach quite similar to the present one. In [13, Theorem 1] we show that ≥ * may arise from a cash sub additive risk measure.
The ranking ≥ P defined in (7) arises in connection with the model uncertainty approach mentioned in the Introduction and exemplified by the paper by Bouchard and Nutz [8] . In this approach each element P of the given collection P is a model 3 .
A more interesting question concerns the conditions under which the ranking ≥ * coincides with the ranking ≥ P for some endogenous probability measure P . In this case we shall say that ≥ * is represented by P . We shall address this question in the last section of this paper.
2.2. Assets. We posit the existence of an asset whose final payoff and current price are used as numéraire of the payoff and of the price of all other assets, respectively. Each asset is identified with its payoff expressed in units of the numéraire and is modelled as an element of F(Ω). The market is then a convex set X ⊂ F(Ω) containing the origin as well as the function identically equal to 1 (that will be simply indicated by 1). Notice that we do not assume that investments may be replicated on any arbitrary scale, i.e. that X is a convex cone, as is customary in this literature.
We assume in addition that (i) each f ∈ X satisfies f ≥ * a for some a ∈ R and (ii) that
The first of these assumptions constraints the assets traded on the market to bear a limited risk of losses and may be interpreted as a restriction imposed by some regulator; the second one permits agents, which in principle may only form convex portfolios, to invest into the numéraire asset an unlimited amount of capital. Notice that, since the numéraire cannot be shorted, the construction of zero cost portfolios -or self-financing strategies -is not possible. We are not assuming that the market prohibits short positions but rather that, in the presence of credit risk, long and short positions even if permitted should be regarded as two different investments as they bear potentially different levels of risk. In other words, when taking short positions, investors affect the implicit counterparty risk and modify de facto the final payoff of the asset shortened.
The issuance of new securities may result in the extension of the set X of traded assets. We may consider to this end several possibilities, varying from one another by the degree of completeness.
A minimal extension is obtained when, along with each asset in X , investors are permitted to take a short position in the corresponding call option (a strategy very common on the market and known as call overwriting). The resulting set of assets is
To the other extreme, we have the case of complete markets. In a model with poor mathematical structure such as the one considered here, the definition of market completeness is not entirely obvious. The idea to define completeness as a situation in which all functions f ∈ F(Ω) are traded 3 It should be noted that the choice of Bouchard and Nutz to take P to be a set of countably additive probabilities has considerable implications on N * which needs e.g. be closed with respect to countable unions.
is indeed too ambitious, as it would be difficult to define a price function on such a large domain.
We rather identify market completeness with the set
which may be loosely interpreted as the set of superhedgeable claims. It is easily seen that L(X )
is a vector lattice containing X as well as B(Ω).
Prices.
In financial markets with frictions and limitations to trade, normalized prices are best modelled as positively homogeneous, subadditive functionals of the asset payoff, π : X → R, satisfying π(1) = 1 and the monotonicity condition
We also require that prices be free of arbitrage opportunities, a property which we define as 4
Of course, (12) implies that π(X) ≥ 0 whenever X ≥ * 0 while (11) need not follow from (12) if short selling is not permitted. We notice that the situation X > * π(X) > 0, exceptional as it appears, does not represent in our model an arbitrage opportunity because of the infeasibility of short positions in the numéraire asset. A firm experiencing difficulties in raising funds for its projects and competing with other firms in a similar position may offer abnormally high returns to those who accept to purchase its debt.
A functional satisfying all the preceding properties -including (12) -will be called a price function and the corresponding set will be indicated with the symbol Π(X ). We thus agree that market prices are free of arbitrage by definition and we shall avoid recalling this crucial property.
At times, though, it will be mathematically useful to consider pricing functionals for which the no arbitrage property (12) may fail. These will be denoted by the symbol Π 0 (X ).
The non linearity of financial prices is a well known empirical feature documented in the microstructure literature (see e.g. the exhaustive survey by Biais et al. [6] ) and essentially accounts for the auxiliary services that are purchased when investing in an asset, such as liquidity provision and inventory services. Subadditivity captures the idea that these services are imperfectly divisible.
Another important property of price functions is cash additivity, defined as 5
(the collection of cash additive price functions will be denoted by Π a (X )). Although π ∈ Π(X ) may fail to be cash additive, it always has a cash additive part π a , i.e. the functional
It is routine to show that π a is the greatest element of Π a (X ) dominated by π.
Notice that the same quantity defined in (14) may be computed for each element of the set X = X − R. If we denote byπ a the corresponding extension,π a ∈ Π(X ) if and only if there exists noX ∈X such thatX > * π a (X). This corresponds to the classical definition of absence of arbitrage, as given in the literature. This remark further clarifies the differences with our definition.
Pricing Measures
Associated with each price π ∈ Π(X ) is the space 6
and, more importantly, the collection of pricing measures 7
The following is a very basic result illustrating the role of cash additivity and of the set M 0 (π).
Lemma 1. For given π ∈ Π 0 (X ) the set M 0 (π) is non empty and each m ∈ M 0 (π) satisfies
Moreover, M 0 (π) = M 0 (π a ) and
Eventually, the set M 0 (π) is convex and compact in the topology induced by L(X ).
Proof. We simply use Hahn-Banach and the representation We easily realize that the functional defined by
is an element of Π 0 (L(X )) extending π. By Hahn-Banach, we can find a linear functional φ on L(X ) such that φ ≤ π and φ(1) = 1. Necessarily, f ≥ * 0 implies φ(f ) ≥ 0 so that, by (4b), φ is ≥ * -monotone and thus m φ ∈ P(Ω). To show that m φ ∈ M 0 (π) observe that, by assumption, each X ∈ X admits a ∈ R such that X ≥ * a so that φ ⊥ (X) ≥ φ ⊥ (a) = 0 and thus π(X) = π(X) ≥ 6 It is easily seen that C (π) is a convex cone containing X . 7 In [13] a pricing measure was defined to be a positive, finitely additive measures dominated by π without restricting it to be a probability. The focus on probabilities will be clear after Theorem 1 φ(X) ≥ Xdm φ . Suppose now that m ∈ M 0 (π) and that f, g ∈ L(X ) and f ≥ * g. Then, by (4b),
{f − g ≤ −ε} ∈ N * for all ε > 0 so that
We deduce (17) from f, g ∈ L 1 (m).
Concerning the claim M 0 (π) = M 0 (π a ), it is clear that the inequality π a ≤ π induces the
The cash additive part π a of π, obtained as in (14), is easily seen to be an extension of π a to L(X ). Of course, π a is the pointwise supremum of the linear functionals φ that it dominates so
The last claim is an obvious implication of Tychonoff theorem [18, I.8.5] . It is enough to note that L(X ) contains B(Ω) so that a cluster point of M 0 (π) in the topology induced by L(X ) is necessarily represented by a finitely additive probability.
Pricing measures closely correspond to the risk-neutral measures which are ubiquitous in the traditional financial literature since the seminal paper of Harrison and Kreps [21] . We only highlight that the existence of pricing measures and their properties are entirely endogenous here and do not depend on any special mathematical assumption -and actually not even on the absence of arbitrage. In traditional models, the condition M 0 (π) = ∅ is obtained via Riesz representation theorem (here replaced with (19) ) and requires an appropriate topological structure. Also notice that (18) may be considered as our version of the superhedging Theorem. Upon re reading the preceding proof one deduces that a version of (18) may be obtained for π (rather than π a ) by replacing M 0 (π) with the collection of finitely additive, positive set functions satisfying (16) .
It is customary to interpret the integral (21) Xdm as the asset fundamental value, although the values obtained for each m ∈ M 0 (π) chosen may differ significantly from one another. We cannot at present exclude the extreme situation of an asset X ∈ X such that X > * 0,
π a (X) > 0 but sup
This case, which, in view of (18) , requires X to be unbounded, describes an asset with no intrinsic value (no matter how computed) which still receives a positive market price. For this reason it would be natural to interpret such price as a pure bubble. In Theorem 1 we shall provide necessary and sufficient conditions which exclude pure bubbles.
Notice that bubbles need not always be pure. We define a bubble as the quantity:
where we used (18) and the fact that
Our definition of a bubble is thus quite conservative as it amounts to the minimum spread of the price over the fundamental value of the asset, no matter how computed.
Another possible failure of pricing measures under the current assumptions is that it may not be possible to support the view expressed in many microstructure models and according to which the ask price π(X) of an asset is obtained by applying some mark-up to its fundamental value, such as
In fact (24) not only requires the absence of pure bubbles, but also the existence of a pricing measure with the property that X > * 0 implies Xdm > 0. This further property will be discussed at length in section 5.
Market Completeness.
Competition among financial intermediaries may involve existing assets and/or the launch of new financial claims. As a consequence it may produce two different effects: (a) a reduction of intermediation margins, and thus lower asset prices, and (b) an enlargement of the set X of traded assets, thus contributing to complete the markets. This short discussion justifies our interest for the set 8
In this section we want to address the following question: under what conditions is it possible to extend the actual markets to obtain an economy with complete financial markets without violating the no arbitrage principle? This translates into the mathematical condition Ext(π) = ∅ and if π ′ ∈ Ext(π) we speak of (L(X ), ≥ * , π ′ ) as a completion of (X , ≥ * , π).
We obtain the following complete characterisation for the case of cash additive completions.
Theorem 1. For a market (X , ≥ * , π) the following properties are mutually equivalent:
(a). π satisfies
. the market (X , ≥ * , π) admits a cash-additive completion, (c). the set M 0 (π) is such that
Proof. Assume that (26) holds and define the functional
Property (4b) and ≥ * monotonicity of π imply that ρ ∈ Ext 0 (π a ). Moreover, it is easily seen that
i.e. that ρ is cash additive. To prove that ρ ∈ Π(L(X )), fix f ∈ L(X ) and k ∈ N such that
Observe that f k ∈ L(X ) and, in search of a contradiction, suppose that ρ(f k ) ≤ 0. Then for each n ∈ N there exist a n ∈ R, λ n > 0 and X n ∈ X such that λ n X n ≥ * f k + a n but λ n π(X n ) < 2 −n + a n . This clearly implies (26) . It follows that ρ(f k ) > 0 and that (a)⇒(b).
Choose ρ ∈ Ext a (π) and let f k be as above. Consider the linear functional
defined on the linear subspace L 0 ⊂ L(X ) spanned by {1, f k }. Given that ρ satisfies (29),φ is dominated by ρ on L 0 so that we can find an extension φ ofφ to the whole of L(X ) still dominated by ρ. As in Lemma 1, given that φ is a positive linear functional on a vector lattice, we obtain the
by positivity. Eventually observe that, again by Lemma 1,
Thus (c) follows from (b).
Assume now (c). Let f ∈ C (π) u be such that f ≥ * 0 and choose n ∈ N arbitrarily. Then there exist λ n > 0 and X n ∈ X such that 2 −n + λ n [X n − π(X n )] ≥ * f . Notice that this implies the inclusion C (π) u ∩ {f ∈ F(Ω) : f ≥ * 0} ⊂ L(X ). But then, for every m ∈ M 0 (π), Lemma 1 and (16) imply f dm ≤ 2 −n + λ n X n dm − π(X n ) ≤ 2 −n so that (a) follows.
It is immediate to recognize a very close relationship between (26) and the No-Free-Lunch-with-Vanishing-Risk (NFLVR) notion formulated long ago by Delbaen and Schachermayer [17] in a highly influential paper. This similarity is quite surprising in view of the deep differences in the starting assumptions of the present model with theirs 9 . The main point is that, in our setting the elements of the form λ[X − π(X)] with λ > 0 and X ∈ X cannot be interpreted as net payoffs of a corresponding trading strategy since the possibility of borrowing funds by shorting the numéraire is precluded as well as the strategy of replicating a given investment on an arbitrary scale. Notice also that in [17] the NFLVR condition was formulated in purely mathematical terms (and with reference to an exogenously given probability measure) while its economic content has remained largely unexplained.
Upon relating condition (26) with the existence of a strictly positive, cash additive extension of the pricing functional, Theorem 1 characterizes the economic role of NFLVR as a condition necessary and sufficient for financial markets to admit an extension that, while completing the family of assets traded, preserves the absence of arbitrage opportunities. The focus on the extension property of financial prices was clear in the papers by Harrison and Kreps [21] and Kreps [22] (see also (23).
Incidentally we remark that, from the equality M 0 (π) = M 0 (π a ), it follows that π satisfies condition (26) if and only if so does π a . More precisely, Lemma 2. Let π ∈ Π 0 (X ). Then: (a) C (π) ⊂ C (π a ) ⊂ C (π) u and (b) for every X ∈ X , π a (X) ≤ 0 if and only if X ∈ C (π) u . Therefore, π a ∈ Π(X ) if and only if (32) C (π) u ∩ {X ∈ X : X > * 0}.
Proof. (a). For each X ∈ X it is obvious that X − π(X) ≤ X − π a (X). However, X − π a (X) is the limit, uniformly as t → +∞, of X + t − π(X + t) ∈ C (π). (b). X ∈ X and π a (X) ≤ 0 imply that for each n ∈ N and for t n > 0 sufficiently large
for some X n ∈ X and λ n ≥ 0, then, moving λ n π(X n ) to the left hand side if positive and using cash additivity, we conclude π a (X) ≤ 2 −n + λ n [π a (X n ) − π(X n )] ≤ 2 −n .
To highlight the role of competition in financial markets, consider two pricing functions π, π ′ ∈ Π(X ). If π ≤ π ′ then C (π ′ ) ⊂ C (π). Thus, lower financial prices are less likely to satisfy (26) and thus to admit an extension to a complete financial market free of arbitrage. Competition among market makers, producing lower spreads, may thus have two contrasting effects on economic welfare.
On the one side it reduces the well known deadweight loss implicit in monopolistic pricing while, on the other, it imposes a limitation to financial innovation and its benefits in terms of the optimal allocation of risk. It may be conjectured that fully competitive pricing, interpreted as the pricing of assets by their fundamental value, may not be compatible with the extension property discussed here. We investigate this issue in the following section.
Eventually, we give a mathematical reformulation of Theorem 1.
Corollary 1. For a market (X , ≥ * , π) the condition (26) is equivalent to the following:
Proof. Of course, the topology of uniform distance is stronger than the one induced by the L 1 (m) distance, for any m ∈ ba(Ω). Thus, (33) implies (26) . On the other hand, if m ∈ M 0 (π) then necessarily (34)
By Theorem 1, if (26) holds then the inequality (34) excludes the existence of f ∈ m∈M 0 (π) C (π)
such that f > * 0.
Corollary 1 suggests the choice of a topology, τ (π), weaker than the one induced by the uniform distance and generated by the family of open sets 10
This topology has the advantage of being endogenously generated by market prices.
To close this section, we observe that a strictly related problem is whether markets my be extended, even if remaining incomplete. Much of what precedes remains true and we thus only give some hints for the case X 1 defined in (9) . Corollary 2. The market (X , ≥ * , π) admits a cash-additive extension (X 1 , ≥ * , π 1 ) if and only if
or, equivalently,
Competitive Complete Markets.
In this section we investigate the conditions under which the set M 0 (π) contains a strictly positive element, i.e. some m such that
If such m ∈ M 0 (π) may be found it is then clear that pricing each payoff in L(X ) by its fundamental value results in an arbitrage free price function. Given our preceding discussion this condition may be rightfully interpreted as the possibility of a fully competitive market completion. The subset of those m ∈ M 0 (π) which satisfy (38) will be indicated by M (π) 11 . The set M (π; X 1 ) can be defined by restricting (38) to elements f ∈ X 1 .
Notice that if m satisfies (38) it is then strictly positive on any non negligible set while the converse is, in general, not true. In fact if f > * 0 then axioms (4) imply that the set {f > 0} is necessarily non negligible, but, since N * need not be closed with respect to countable unions, they are not sufficient to exclude that {f > ε} ∈ N * for all ε > 0.
In the preceding sections we interpreted the sublinearity of the pricing functional π as an indication of market imperfections, e.g. the market power of market makers. If ρ ∈ Π 0 (L(X )) a possible measure of market power is defined as follows (with the convention 0/0 = 0): Clearly, 0 ≤ m(ρ) ≤ 1 and the two extrema correspond to the polar cases of perfect competition and full monopoly. If, e.g., the price of each asset is set by applying a mark-up to its fundamental value, as in (24) , then the maximum mark-up on the market provides an upper bound to m(ρ) which is then strictly less than unity. On the other side, if prices include fixed costs, then m(ρ) may well reach 1. As we shall see, the case m(ρ) = 1 is an extreme case of special importance.
The question we want to address next is: given a market, is it possible to find a completion that permits some degree of competitiveness? In symbols, this translates into the question of whether there exists ρ ∈ Ext(π) such that m(ρ) < 1. This condition has in fact far reaching implications. Then, ρ is cash additive and m(ρ) = 0, by linearity. Conversely, assume that ρ ∈ Ext(π) is cash additive and that m(ρ) < 1. Define for each n ∈ N the set (41) B n = b ∈ L(X ) : 1 ≥ b > * 0 and ρ(b) > 1/n and notice that {f ∈ L(X ) : 1 ≥ f > * 0} = n B n , because ρ ∈ Ext(π). Denote by co(B n ) the
In view of the properties of M 0 (π) proved in Lemma 1, we can then apply Sion minimax Theorem [26, Corollary 3.3] and obtain from (18) 0
Therefore, for each n ∈ N there exists µ n ∈ M 0 (ρ) such that inf f ∈co(Bn) f dµ n ≥ (1−m(ρ))/2n > 0.
Define m = n 2 −n µ n . Then, m ∈ M 0 (ρ) ⊂ M 0 (π) and, as a consequence, L(X ) ⊂ L 1 (m). But then, if f > * 0 we conclude that f ∧ 1 ∈ L(X ), that f ∧ 1 > * 0 and that (f ∧ 1)dm > 0 so that
What the preceding Theorem 2 asserts in words is that if a complete, arbitrage free market is possible under limited market power, it is then possible under perfect competition -i.e. with assets priced according to their fundamental value. This does not exclude, however, the somewhat paradoxical situation in which the only possibility to complete the markets is by admitting unlimited market power by financial intermediaries. As noted above, this describes the terms of a potential conflict between the effort of regulating the market power of intermediaries and the support to a process of financial innovation that does not disrupt market stability by introducing arbitrage opportunities.
Let us remark that the condition m(ρ) < 1, although economically sound, is not a trivial one, at least when the structure of non negligible sets is sufficiently rich i.e. when uncertainty is a complex phenomenon. Consider, e.g., the case in which an uncountable family of possible, alternative scenarios is given. In mathematical terms we can model this situation via an uncountable, pairwise disjoint collection {A α : α ∈ A} of non negligible subsets of Ω. Then, if ρ ∈ Ext(π) and f α = 1 Aα it must be that ρ(f α ) > 0 for each α ∈ A and thus, for some appropriately chosen δ > 0 and
But then, 1≤n≤N (1/N )ρ(f αn ) > δ while ρ 1≤n≤N (1/N )f αn ≤ 1/N so that m(ρ) = 1. Thus, in the case under consideration m(ρ) = 1. Let us also remark that in the probabilistic approach, in which N * coincides with the collection of null sets of some a priori given probability, the existence of the collection {A α : α ∈ A} above is not possible 12 .
Lemma 3. Assume the existence of uncountably many, pairwise disjoint non negligible sets. Then for each market (X , ≥ * , π) (and with inf ∅ = 1),
The cash additive extensions ρ of π that satisfy the condition m(ρ) < 1 have special mathematical properties even if not free of arbitrage.
Theorem 3. Let ρ ∈ Π 0 (L(X )) be cash additive and such that m(ρ) < 1. Then there exists
Proof. For each α in a given set A, let A α n n∈N be a decreasing sequence of subsets of Ω satisfying the following properties: (i) for each α, β ∈ A there exists n(α, β) ∈ N such that
and (ii) for each α ∈ A there exists m α ∈ M 0 (ρ) such that lim n m α (A α n ) > 0. If the set A is uncountable, then, as in the preceding Lemma 3, we can fix δ > 0 and extract a sequence But then, taking w i = 1/k, we obtain
so that m(ρ) = 1. We thus reach the conclusion that A must be countable and deduce from this and from [15, Theorem 2] that M 0 (ρ) is dominated by some of its elements, µ. In addition, M 0 (ρ)
is weak * compact as a subset of ba(Ω), as proved in Lemma 1. It follows from [28, Theorem 1.3] that M 0 (ρ) is weakly compact. If µ does not dominate M 0 (ρ) uniformly, we can then find a sequence E n n∈N of subsets of Ω, a sequence m n n∈N in M 0 (ρ) and some constant d > 0 such that µ(E n ) → 0 while m n (E n ) > d. Passing to a subsequence, we can assume that m n n∈N is 12 In mathematics the condition that no uncountable, pairwise disjoint collection of non empty sets may be given, is known as the countable chain (CC) condition and was first formulated by Maharam [23] . See the comments in [15] .
It is clear that in the following statement the collection {Aα : α ∈ A} may be chosen to meet a weaker condition, namely that the pairwise intersections are negligible sets.
weakly convergent and so, by the finitely additive version of the Theorem of Vitali, Hahn and Saks (see e.g. [5, Theorem 8.7.4] ), that the set {m n : n ∈ N} is uniformly absolutely continuous with respect to m 0 = n 2 −n m n and, since µ ≫ m 0 , with respect to µ as well which is contradictory.
We conclude that In this case one may choose µ ∈ M (π).
Proof. If µ ∈ M (π) then, by definition, X ⊂ L 1 (µ) and f dµ ≤ 0 for each f ∈ C (π) L 1 (µ) which rules out f > * 0. Conversely, if µ ∈ P(Ω) satisfies (50) and h > * 0, then h ∧ 1 ∈ L 1 (µ) and
h ∧ 1 > * 0. There exists then a positive and continuous linear functional φ h on L 1 (µ) such that
Given that necessarily φ h (1) > 0, (51) remains unchanged if we replace φ h by its normalization so that we can assume φ h (1) = 1. This implies that φ h ∈ Ext 0 (π) and, by [11, Theorem 2] , that φ h admits the representation
for some m h ∈ M 0 (π) such that L 1 (µ) ⊂ L(m h ) and m h ≪ µ. Moreover, by exploiting the finitely additive version of Halmos and Savage theorem, [12, Theorem 1] , we obtain that the set {m h : h > * 0} is dominated by some m 0 ∈ M 0 (π). It is then clear that m 0 (f ∧ 1) > 0 for all f > * 0 and thus that m 0 ∈ M (π).
Let us mention that under finite additivity the existence of a strictly positive element of M 0 (π) established in Theorem 2, is not sufficient to imply that the set M 0 (π) is dominated, i.e. that each of its elements is absolutely continuous with respect to a given one. It rather induces the weaker conclusion that there is a given pricing measure m 0 such that m 0 (A) = 0 implies m(A) = 0 for all m ∈ M 0 (π).
On the other hand, if such a dominating element exists then, by weak compactness, it dominates M 0 (π) uniformly. A similar conclusion is not true in the countably additive case treated in the traditional approach. In that approach, the set of risk neutral measures is dominated as an immediate consequence of the assumption of a given, reference probability measure but such set is not weakly * compact when regarded as a subset of the space of finitely additive measures. This special feature illustrates a possible advantage of the finitely additive approach over the countably additive one.
As above, we can formulate a version of the preceding results valid for partial extensions. Again, the proofs remain essentially unchanged. Let X 1 be defined as in (9) . Specializing definitions (39) and (38) by replacing F(Ω) with X 1 we obtain the definitions of m(ρ; X 1 ) replacing m(ρ) when ρ ∈ Π(X 1 ) and of M (π; X 1 ) replacing M (π).
Corollary 3. The market (X , ≥ * , π) satisfies M (π; X 1 ) = ∅ if and only if it admits a cash additive extension (X 1 , ≥ * , ρ 1 ) with m(ρ 1 ; X 1 ) < 1.
Countably Additive Markets
Given the emphasis on countable additivity which dominates the traditional financial literature, it is natural to ask if it possible to characterise those markets in which the set M 0 (π) contains a countably additive element. A more ambitious question is whether such measure is strictly positive, i.e. an element on M (π).
Not surprisingly, an exact characterisation may be obtained by considering the fairly unnatural possibility of forming portfolios which invest in countably many different assets. This induces to modify the quantity appearing in (39) into the following (again with the convention 0/0 = 0):
for all sequences f n n∈N in B(Ω) + such that n f n ∈ B(Ω). Notice that in principle, the inequality m c (ρ; f 1 , f 2 , . . .) ≥ 0 is no longer valid while, of course, the inequality m c (ρ; f 1 , f 2 , . . .) ≤ 1 is still true. It may at first appear obvious that, upon buying separately each component of a given portfolio, the investment cost results higher, but considered more carefully, this is indeed correct only if the infinite sum n ρ(f n ) corresponds to an actual cost, i.e only if such a strategy of buying separately infinitely many assets is feasible on the market. The conditions for the existence of a countably additive pricing measure listed under (a) and (b) are perhaps deceptively simple. In fact the inequality n c (ρ) > −∞ implies that, if f n n∈N is a uniformly bounded sequence of negligible functions, then necessarily sup n f n has to be negligible as well. Thus, e.g., N * has to be closed with respect to countable unions. This property requires a rather deep reformulation of the axioms (4) that characterize economic rationality, ≥ * , and there may well be cases in which such additional conditions are simply contradictory. If, e.g., Ω is a separable metric space and N * consists of sets of first category then, as is well known, P ca (Ω, N * ) = ∅, see [27, Théorème 1] .
In the classical setting of continuous time finance, the order ≥ * is generated by some countably additive probability and each X ∈ X is of the form X = W X 0 + θ X dS where S is, e.g., a locally bounded semimartingale with respect to the given probability measure, θ is a predictable process integrable with respect to S and its price, in the absence of frictions, is ρ(X) = W X 0 . Although the condition m c (ρ) = 0 is immediate the inequality n c (ρ) > −∞ is not at all obvious. In fact, even when 0 ≤ X n ≤ X n+1 and X 0 = lim n X n ∈ B(Ω) it is not easy to show that there is θ 0 such that (57) n θ Xn dS = θ 0 dS.
Monotonicity
Let us return to the common order ≥ * with which we started. Given the discussion in the introduction, it is natural to ask whether ≥ * arises from some probability or some family of probabilities i.e whether ≥ * is of the form (6) or (7) . This may be regarded as a decision theoretic issue, completely independent from financial theory. The answer to this question is, in the general case, in the negative.
First we notice that N * is closed with respect to subsets and to union, i.e. it is an ideal (of sets). For fixed A / ∈ N * the family {A \ N : N ∈ N * } is a filter and it is thus possible to construct an ultrafilter probability P A assigning unit mass to each element in it. Thus P A ∈ P(Ω, N * ) and P A (A) = 1 and so N * coincides with the intersection of the null sets of the collection P = {P A :
A / ∈ N * }. Needless to say, it may well be that none of the elements of P is countably additive (or even has a non trivial countably additive part).
Second, even letting P be a family of probability functions with the property that A ∈ N * if and only if sup P ∈P P (A) = 0, this would not imply that ≥ * coincides with the ranking ≥ P as defined in (7) -unless the elements of P are countably additive. To this end we need an additional condition:
(4d) if f + ε > * 0 for all ε > 0 then f ≥ * 0 f ∈ F(Ω).
Indeed it is easily seen that upon adding (4d) to (4a) -(4c), f ≥ * 0 is equivalent to {f < −ε} ∈ N * for all ε > 0 so that ≥ * coincides with ≥ P for any P ⊂ P(Ω) with the above property. Proof. If P ∈ P(Ω) represents ≥ * then (4d) is necessarily true. Moreover, identifying P with an element of Π(B(Ω)), condition (ii) holds. If in addition P is countably additive, then (iii) is also true. This proves necessity for both claims. Conversely, assume that (i) and (ii) hold. By Theorem 2 there exists P ∈ M (ρ). If (iii) is also true, then we deduce from Theorem 5 that such P is countably additive. The proof is complete upon noting that in either case N * coincides with P null sets and that, as remarked above, f ≥ * 0 if and only if {f ≤ −ε} ∈ N * .
We derive from this simple result the surprising conclusion that, assuming (4d), then in order for the existence of a cash additive extension of the price system it is necessary that economic rationality is defined in probabilistic terms. It was noted in [13, p. 546 ] that condition (4d) should be viewed as a robustness criterion of the statement f ≥ * 0 in the face of measurement errors of arbitrarily small magnitude.
